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Journal Articles International Journal of Industrial Organization Year : 2016

Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

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hal-02980111 , version 1 (27-10-2020)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02980111 , version 1

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Gabriel Desgranges, Stéphane Gauthier. Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, 44, pp.163-176. ⟨hal-02980111⟩
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