An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat

B. Julien; Jérôme Pouyet; Wilfried Sand-Zantman

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12196

Journal articles

An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat

B. Julien Jérôme Pouyet ¹ Wilfried Sand-Zantman ¹

1 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications

Document type :

Journal articles

Domain :

Humanities and Social Sciences / Economics and Finance

Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-cyu.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-02980365
Contributor : Cybu Recherche <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, October 27, 2020 - 2:38:47 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 28, 2020 - 3:33:31 AM

An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat

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An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat

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